On the materiality and immateriality of fraud and of government knowledge of fraud for legal challenges to US government Covid policies, programs and product use.
On the materiality and immateriality of fraud and of government knowledge of fraud for legal challenges to US government Covid policies, programs and product use.
NOTES:
This post is an unedited, cut-and-paste of an email exchange that happened today.
It doesn't provide background, or link to more than a couple of related Bailiwick posts and case documents for Jackson v. Pfizer, Bridges v. Houston Methodist Hospital, other Covid-era federal cases and my work developing responsive legal strategies (i.e. "dual-use government officials of concern" strategies) due to my decision to not spend time today tracking down and embedding more links and contextualizing passages.
As a result, this post is mostly useful for readers who already have a handle on key Covid litigation, prior Bailiwick coverage and general legal strategy principles.
The email thread started with a reader sending me a link to this case, [Roberts v. Shriner, Inslee] filed Oct. 13, 2023, noting "challenges constitutionality of PREP. Maybe interesting."
I wrote back:
One of the patterns I’m noticing is how much the post-Bridges, post-Jackson cases are mostly variations on the same basic argument: that there was/is a legal obligation (contractual, statutory, constitutional, and/or regulatory) on some party (hospital/employer, US gov, state gov, manufacturer) to perform a duty to provide truthful information to a counter party (product purchaser, injection recipient, employee), that the party didn’t perform, giving rise to the injured parties claims.
And how clearly the Texas federal judges in Bridges and Jackson indicated that there were/are no such obligations or duties to perform under the PHE/EUA/OTA conditions, giving judicial weight to the arguments already in the HHS and DOJ legal opinions about the legal force of the statutes, regulations and contracts.
Lawyers filing cases post-Bridges, post-Jackson don’t want to or can’t process the information that the judges have provided, and therefore can’t/don’t address it in their subsequent cases.
Reader replied:
Is there some angle to sue the Gov (Operation Warp Speed? DOD? BARDA?) for improper use of PHE/EUA/OTA resulting in poisonous substances delivered, because there was no obligation to provide truthful information about the product per Jackson, Bridges?
My reply
I think that would be related to the imposter/occupier/treason approaches, but modifying it somewhat.
The argument I want the lawyers to make is that the laws are written in such a way that the only possible use of the laws is to cover up production and use of illegal biochemical weapons, by camouflaging them from all observers by calling them ‘vaccines’ and other medicinal products.
The elimination of the crime of fraud, through the laws, is an essential part of the program.
This is the argument: “These laws are illegitimate and used properly but for illegitimate purposes (killing people) in this case.”
The government and pharma position is: “These laws are legitimate and used properly for legitimate purposes (managing an emergency/pandemic).”
The “improper use” argument you outline would be an intermediate position between those two ends of the spectrum, to argue that the laws are written to authorize legitimate government functions, but in this specific instance, the laws were misused and misapplied.
But I think that runs into the same “actual behavior” problem that Jackson’s case brought to light.
Truthful information was in fact brought to the attention of the government officials (by Brook Jackson), but their access to truthful information didn’t change their “actual behavior.”
Judge Truncale found that fact extremely persuasive to make the point that the information Brook provided, even assuming its’ truth, was “not material:” the program is proceeding exactly as Congress, Presidents and federal agencies intended and therefore should not be stopped.
This is related to his contortions around his refusal to “take judicial notice” of Brook’s notification of DoD in Dec. 2020 (FN 20 at p. 33 of his order), but those are contortions; he basically accepted as true the fact that FDA and DoD had access to the information Brook provided them, but concluded that because their knowledge didn’t change their actual behavior, the information was immaterial to their decisions and programs.
His discussion of these issues is at p. 33 and 40 of the March 31, 2023 order:
March 31, 2023 - Judge Truncale Order Dismissing Jackson v. Pfizer.
His footnote contains another interesting sentence: “while these documents could potentially be introduced through a motion for summary judgment or at trial they are not properly before the Court at this time.”
That’s garbage, because Pfizer’s own Motion to Dismiss was an excellent pre-trial opportunity for him to consider the documents.
But Brook Jackson’s lawyers could have filed a motion for summary judgment (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56) saying that — assuming all of her claims are true and that it’s an undisputed fact that she notified FDA and DoD of the problems — she’s entitled to a decision in her favor.
This is related to but not the same as what I was trying to get them to move toward in Feb. 2023 as they were prepping to respond to the Motion to Dismiss and I suggested that they file a request under Federal Rules of Evidence 201, to get the unconstitutionality and criminality of the laws and regulations and contracts themselves in front of the judge.
It’s probable that the judges would rule the same way: that even though FDA and DoD had knowledge of the clinical trial corruption and toxicity of the products, they continued buying and deploying the products anyway, such that their “actual behavior” renders the corruption and toxicity immaterial.
But summary judgment motions would be a way to make the basic parts of the crime more visible to more people.
Really it’s not that fraud was immaterial to the government’s actions.
It’s that fraud was so material — so central — to the government’s actions (Pfizer, FDA and DoD delivered the fraud as ordered, without which the program couldn’t go on), that knowledge of the fraud delivered to the government by an outsider (Brook Jackson) was immaterial to the government’s actions because it was knowledge they had had since long before use of the programs started.
