Immunomodulation and fear modulation.

Plus notes on the current spin-up of the Ebola threat.

Robert Malone at about 59:50 of Children’s Health Defense panel discussion, Oct. 28, 2022:

As I said at the outset, I couldn’t design a better product to elicit these adverse events and outcomes associated with immune imprinting if I had sat down at a computer for six years. It is the ideal product for driving immune imprinting, which has been a chronic problem with influenza vaccines.

Robert Malone at about 1:05:00

Those defective interfering particles…it’s not that they are immunogenic.

It’s that they interfere with a lot of functional activities that might otherwise be able to control virus, because they’re busy…

It’s as if the defective interfering particles are a sponge…

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Robert Malone also made a passing comment about the threat of Ebola in his performance during the CHD panel discussion, while walking that thin, thin line between

a) the truth that governments, Gatesian-depopulation zealots, and pharmaceutical corporations “spin up” threats to maintain population docility, manufacturing capacity and market share, and

b) the vested interest he shares with them, as a product developer who has worked in that space for many decades, in maintaining widespread fear of communicable disease outbreaks and fostering unthinking submission to government-directed, government-funded ‘countermeasures.’

The mid-terms are over, and as predicted, Ebola panic porn is ramping up to prime the population to accept another round of crushing social and economic restrictions and submit to more injectable bioweapons. See MicrosoftNews; Post-Gazette; CNN.

In Spring 2022 interviews, Attorney Todd Callender shared information about his contact with researchers who, he said, demonstrated that 5G electromagnetic frequencies directed to lipid nanoparticles containing pathogens, can break down the lipid coatings, and release the pathogens, including hemorrhagic fevers such as Marburg virus. See Corona Investigating Committee transcript, March 25, 2022 and Forbidden Knowledge interview transcript, May 18, 2022.

Back in 2020, again at the instigation of unindicted war criminal Robert Kadlec, HHS issued a PREP Act declaration for marburgviruses, “a group of filoviruses of the same family as ebolaviruses,” bestowing PREP Act liability immunity on all those involved in countermeasures development, distribution and use.

Callender said in the May 2022 interview:

I also have one whistleblower inside of FEMA, who said that the plan is to scare the hell out of everybody and scare them into going to the quarantine centers, because they don’t think they can collect everybody, by themselves. The doors will be open and then of course, in there, you’ll get your mandatory shot, because you came in voluntarily.

So what we’d like to do is help people understand: Don’t run into the FEMA camps, because you’re going to get one of these shots, just like the COVID ones.

And number two, you can treat this yourself, there’s preparation you can do and if we get the word out sufficiently.

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A couple of days ago, smallvoice on Gab, a former vaccine nurse, posted a comment about ‘drones’ from Africa flown into the U.S. and other western countries to seed outbreaks.

Ebola in 2014, subsequent to August 4, 2014, was intended to be a worldwide outbreak. Sorry, link has vanished. The article was in a Nigerian press outlet.

In early 2014, (this link I'll put here if I can still find it) the Nigerian and Kenyan authorities set up biological surveillance and health checkpoints in their airports for OUTBOUND passengers who were required to have destination/return tickets to the US and Europe. These were set up on the recommendations of US, African and European health authorities from the intelligence that organized crime in African countries had expressed interest in biological warfare.

Four individuals were detained in Nigeria that had return tickets for Dallas/Ft. Worth, Los Angeles, Miami, and Chicago and were quarantined and questioned. Two were already so gravely ill with Ebola, they were hospitalized. One of the remaining two gave a very forthcoming interview about his situation.

He was, as many Nigerians are, in debt to the local organized crime organization, borrowing money for just his and his children's living expenses. It was debt that he could never pay back and according to local culture, and would then be collected from his children if he were killed. The criminals informed him his debt would be satisfied if he would agree to become a Drone. That is the term used for a person infected with a highly transmissible disease and sent to foreign countries to disseminate it.

I was aware of this term several months prior to the interview. Drones are inoculated with the disease, are given $5k US cash, accommodations for 14 days in a mid-range hotel, and a 2nd class airline roundtrip ticket to a populous city. The are told all they have to do to keep the cash, cancel their lifetime debt and save the lives of their children is, survive the disease and spread it to as many people as possible in the destination city.

The US press has never fully disclosed the story of one of the Drones that made it to Dallas/Ft. Worth (the unemployed cab driver) and has changed the story about the one (child, if I recall) that made it to Chicago. The press from Africa was more forthcoming. But, that is why we ended up with 3 or 4 US ebola cases in the US.

And yes, that is exactly what it was for.

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Then there’s the loose affiliation of independent science analysts, including Jonathan Couey, exploring the possibility that SARS-CoV-2 is a synthetic infectious clone designed by Ralph Baric with funding from Anthony Fauci through NIAID, released at specific locations and specific times over the past three years to cause localized but self-limiting outbreaks, thanks to natural, God-designed mutations driving the pathogens from higher virulence to lower virulence and the natural, God-designed ability of the human immune system to fight off pathogenic threats, heal the damage caused by systemic injuries, and learn to recognize and fight off similar threats more quickly and more effectively thereafter.

Why did the Baric/Fauci team release localized outbreaks, knowing that they would be self-limiting?

Because the real goal was to “spin up” population-wide fear, set off the fraudulent PCR mass-testing craze, and funnel people into long-term, compliant, routine individual relationships with the nascent government-directed, government-funded, injectable mRNA countermeasures market and the digital surveillance and digital currency platforms being built atop ‘vaccine’ passports as a new condition for individual participation in human society.

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I do not know if the US Government, DOD, HHS, DHS, FEMA, Pfizer, Moderna and Bill Gates have the biological, chemical and electromagnetic tools to make injectable lipid nanoparticles that contain embedded, dormant pathogens that can be activated to cause symptomatic hemorrhagic fever outbreaks.

What I do know is this:

They have the media, propaganda and information control tools to make it look like they can do those things, and to manipulate readers, viewers and listeners to behave as if those things are true even if those things are false.

Or, more precisely, they have the information control tools to get people to behave as if isolated, but truly-deadly, orchestrated incidents automatically mean there are invisible, large-scale threats, for which the US Government and its public-private partnerships with conspirators in academia, multinational ‘health’ organizations, and the private sector, are trustworthy leaders for subsequent emergency response and management programs.

They've already demonstrated their extraordinary capacity to get people to go along with massive lies. They are rolling out the next act in a dramatic production.

Don't respond to the next acts as if the liars have suddenly developed an interest in telling us the truth.

The bad guys may be unable to do all the things they have clearly told us they want to do: sicken, kill, sterilize, track-and-trace, microchip and control the movements and beliefs of as many of the world’s people as possible.

They have already done some of those things, to some of the people.

And they’ve made many more believe that they have a level of technological and pharmaceutical power and control they probably do not have.

The main thing they need now is a credulous, terrorized population, because the people who believe their terrifying lies will walk right into the direct control grid behind the fear curtain.

Do NOT comply with the globalist demand that you be afraid. Do NOT comply with the globalist demand that you stay in your home, or leave your home and go to a quarantine camp, or shut your business, or put on a mask, or take a test, or take another set of lethal injections.

Do not fear. Be not afraid.

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Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology, US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine, June 19, 2018.

Contributors: Committee on Strategies for Identifying and Addressing Potential Biodefense Vulnerabilities Posed by Synthetic Biology; Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Board on Life Sciences; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Ralph Baric of UNC Chapel Hill was among the invited speakers.

Table of Contents¹

Chapter 6 - ASSESSMENT OF CONCERNS RELATED TO BIOWEAPONS THAT ALTER THE HUMAN HOST

• Modifying the Human Microbiome, 71

• Modifying the Human Immune System, 74

• Modifying the Human Genome, 77

pp. 74-77 - MODIFYING THE HUMAN IMMUNE SYSTEM

Human immunity is the bulwark for protection against infectious disease. Two basic systems respond to the vast array of threats in the natural environment. The first is the innate immune system, a collection of nonspecific protective mechanisms triggered by pathogen-associated molecular patterns, such as lipoteichoic acid from Gram-positive bacteria or unmethylated CpG sequences in viral DNA.

The second is the adaptive immune system, which generates highly specific antibody and T-cell responses tailored to individual diseases and disease variants.

Many natural pathogens manipulate the human immune system, both by suppressing the immune response (e.g., immunodeficiency viruses) and by upregulating certain responses (e.g., respiratory syncytial virus, which induces the immune system to favor a response involving Type 2 T helper cells [Th2] and subsequently increases the proclivity toward asthma [Lotz and Peebles, 2012]).

These examples suggest that it may be feasible to develop a bioweapon capable of manipulating or “engineering” the immune response.

Several potential forms for such a bioweapon were considered:

Engineering immunodeficiency.

Manipulating a target population to have decreased immunity could increase the impact of a biological attack. This goal could be pursued either by manipulating a pathogen to simultaneously reduce immunity and cause disease (Jackson et al., 2001) or by separately introducing an immune-suppressing agent and a bioweapon into a target population.

Agents used to cause immunodeficiency could be pathogens (e.g., the insidious spread of HIV [human immunodeficiency virus]) or chemicals (see NRC [1992] and IPCS [1996] for discussions of chemicals that contribute to immunotoxicity).

It is also possible that a disease agent could be tailored to the immune state of a population, either by engineering the agent to avoid extant adaptive or innate immune barriers or by actually taking advantage of those barriers (for further discussion see Chapter 7, Health-Associated Data and Bioinformatics).

Engineering hyperreactivity.

The flip side of engineering immune deficiencies would be to attempt to cause immune hyperreactivity. Both pathogens and chemicals have been demonstrated to create a cytokine storm, a dangerous state that results from a positive feedback loop in the immune response.

It may be possible to engineer an agent to purposefully trigger such a cascade. For example, some have suggested that the introduction of anthrax lethal toxin into a more benign disease vector could trigger a cytokine storm (Muehlbauer et al., 2007; Brojatsch et al., 2014; however, see Guichard et al., 2012 for a differing point of view).

Similarly, the fact that there are already widespread responses in the human population to a limited number of well-known allergens (ACAAI, 2017) may provide a means of engineering biological threats that would trigger life-threatening IgE-mediated immune responses. The development and testing of new immunotherapies could also provide a roadmap for potentially engineering threats; for example, actors could learn from clinical studies in which anti-CD28 antibodies caused life-threatening cytokine storms (Suntharalingam et al., 2006).

Engineering autoimmunity.

Natural autoimmune diseases cause significant disability and death. It may be possible to engineer a disease that causes the body to turn on itself. Mouse models for the stimulation of auto-immunity now exist.

For example, Experimental Autoimmune Encephalomyelitis, which mimics the symptoms of the human malady multiple sclerosis, has been induced in mice by immunization with antigens that cause an immune response (autoantigens; see Miller et al., 2007).

Normally, such self-immunization is prevented by the mechanisms that ensure exclusion of antibodies and T-cells that are self-reactive, but some pathogens may present antigens that are similar enough to the body’s own proteins that the original immune response spreads from the pathogen to the new human target.

Research into checkpoint inhibitors, compounds designed to unleash the human immune system to eradicate tumors, could also potentially inform efforts to purposely engineer autoimmunity. By overstimulating the immune system, checkpoint inhibitors have been shown to lead to autoimmunity, often in the form of colitis (June et al., 2017). In addition, particular compounds have been shown to lead to an autoimmune disease of the liver (Tanaka et al., 2017, 2018). One potential route of attack could be to introduce such compounds via the microbiome.

The assessment of concerns related to immunomodulation is summarized here and described in detail below.

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Usability of the Technology (Medium Concern)

It is difficult to predict precisely the impact of engineering on a system as complex as the immune system. We are only now beginning to more fully understand the mechanisms for how the immune system recognizes foreign antigens, and many immune mechanisms, such as how immune memory guides future responses, remain opaque. In addition, much of the research in this area is on animals, and the results do not necessarily map well to humans. Furthermore, while there has been an explosion of new research into the causes of autoimmunity, the onset of autoimmune disease remains idiosyncratic (Rosen and Casciola-Rosen, 2016), and it would likely be difficult to create immunomodulatory weapons capable of causing reliable effects in populations as genetically and immunologically diverse as the United States. In particular, while an immune deficiency virus pandemic has emerged naturally, engineering the spread of immune deficiency is currently difficult to imagine.

However, even undirected efforts in this area could be successful enough to warrant concern. In experiments in which mousepox was augmented with interleukin-4 (IL-4) (Jackson et al., 2001), earlier studies had already discerned that vaccinia virus altered with IL-4 increased virulence in mice (van den Broek et al., 2000), but it came as a surprise that the altered mousepox virus could also overcome vaccination against mousepox.

The failed clinical trial of anti-CD28 antibodies, in which patients suffered life-threatening cytokine storms after receiving doses 500 times lower than those shown safe in mouse models (Suntharalingam et al., 2006), offers another example. Although modeling studies indicated that the doses used would nearly saturate the T-cell population of a human (suggesting the potential for overactivation), the dramatic outcomes highlight the potential for inadvertent immune hyperreactivity as well as the dual-use potential of immunomodulation research. The concept of engineering a cytokine storm, especially in susceptible subpopulations, may become a concern when coupled with increasing knowledge of the immune system. For example, the growing knowledge of superantigens that hyperstimulate immunity could further increase the feasibility of such activities.

Our understanding of human immunity also represents an increasing, but unknown, area of concern. For example, with the advent of next-generation sequencing, the range of both B-cell and T-cell responses to vaccines can now be described in molecular detail. Similarly, the effectors of the pattern recognition receptors of the innate immune system are being defined to the point that engineering responses, both therapeutic and otherwise, are possible (Brubaker et al., 2015; Macho and Zipfel, 2015).

In addition, the continuing explosion of work in immunotherapy broadly could potentially create a roadmap for the development of immunomodulatory weapons. As understanding of this phenomenon improves and as the ability to engineer protein structures improves, the opportunities for creating synthetic simulacrum of antigens already known to be present in autoimmune diseases will increase. The opportunities to engineer autoimmunity are likely tempered by the diversity of potential auto- antigens that can be exploited, although this could also be viewed as a means of disease targeting as more and more personalized health data become available (see Chapter 7, Health-Associated Data and Bioinformatics).

On balance, given the challenges and both near- and longer-term opportunities, there is a medium level of concern with regard to usability of the technology for the variety of ways in which immunomodulation might be employed as a bioweapon.

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Usability as a Weapon (Medium-Low Concern)

The connections between factors capable of influencing immunity and the actual immune response of individuals remain poorly understood. Although it is possible to imagine generic degradations to, or overstimulation or mis-stimulation of, the human immune system, it will initially be very difficult to target such threats to particular individuals or populations, and thereby to have a clear and predictable path to an overall impact on a population’s health or on military readiness and response.

However, although immunomodulation might not necessarily be the most effective approach for an adversary seeking to effect large-scale and immediate death or debilitation, this approach could nonetheless undermine a nation’s capabilities. The 1918 influenza pandemic, likely abetted by an interplay between viral infectivity and poor public health, was a major factor in military preparations for the first World War (Byerly, 2010); this historical example serves as a reminder that a general decrease in immunity would even today have strategic consequences for the military machine.

Nonetheless, because there are few ways to model or manipulate the human immune system other than by carrying out large-scale experiments on humans themselves, the amenability of this particular threat to improvement via the Design-Build-Test cycle is minimal, and predictability of results is likely to remain a significant barrier in the near term.

Therefore, there is a medium- low level of concern with regard to this factor with the engineering of delivery systems amenable to delivery of immunomodulatory factors an area to monitor.

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Requirements of Actors (Low Concern)

The expertise required to modulate human immunity with any degree of surety is likely quite high. In particular, choosing appropriate animal models for testing immunomodulatory interventions remains an art with only a few capable practitioners (Taneja and David, 2001; Benson et al., 2018). Moreover, several of the approaches consid- ered would require an actor to not only successfully develop and deploy the immunomodulatory weapon itself but to successfully plan and execute a multipronged attack in which the immunomodulatory weapon is combined with another biological attack (such as deploying a pathogen after an initial attack causing immunodeficiency) or specialized public health knowledge (such as vulnerabilities created by vaccination patterns, see Chapter 7, Health- Associated Data and Bioinformatics).

Such approaches therefore increase the already advanced level of expertise required to effect an immunomodulatory attack, leading to an overall low level of concern for this factor. However, fast-advancing research in immunotherapies may reduce some of these barriers and expand the availability of the appropriate knowledge and skills in the coming years.

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Potential for Mitigation (High Concern)

Modulation or evasion of the human immune system is already a hallmark of many pathogens, many of which are constantly developing novel means to avoid immune surveillance (e.g., seasonal adoption of new glycosylation sites by influenza) (Tate et al., 2014). There are also likely many unknown or undercharacterized pathogens that are currently biasing immune responsivity. These natural dynamics would make differentiating between natural and synthetic threats a considerable challenge.

It may be particularly daunting to identify the hand of a designer versus the opportunism of nature in a given epitope in a pathogen variant that leads to autoimmunity. The lack of knowledge regarding the mechanisms for discriminating self versus non-self would also increase the challenges associated with recognizing an attack and deploying effective countermeasures. For these reasons, there is a relatively high level of concern with regard to this factor.

Whereas public health measures can potentially be useful in countering a threat involving immunomodulation, recognizing a problem and deploying the appropriate countermeasures would not necessarily be easy or quick; the slow response to the AIDS epidemic, albeit almost 40 years ago, is a potential cautionary tale in this regard.

The current state of knowledge regarding immunity is such that it is likely far easier to craft an immunomodulatory weapon than an effective response to one. Even if good countermeasures could be crafted, their expense would likely be inordinate, especially for more general attacks on population immunity…

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[Chapter] SUMMARY

• The alteration of humans through mechanisms that are different than conventional pathogens is an important potential concern area. The reduction or removal of key bottlenecks and barriers in the future could make some of the approaches discussed in this chapter more feasible.

• As understanding of microbiomes increases, the possibility of misuse also increases, and it may become feasible to use synthetic biology to engineer the microbiome to transfer toxic genes, debilitate human immunity, improve pathogen entry or spread, or create dysbioses.

• The threat posed by human immune modulation is limited by current knowledge, but knowledge is accumulating rapidly enough that it may well become more feasible to predictably modify the human immune system.

• Strategies to modify the human genome or alter gene expression in undesirable ways include gene editing, delivery of RNA molecules, and use of chemicals with epigenetic effects, although significant technical and delivery barriers remain that constrain feasibility…

…Overall, the engineering of hyperimmunity and subsequent pathogenesis seems a greater threat than the engineering of reduced immunity or autoimmunity. The former is acute and fits more readily with individual pathogens and weaponization scenarios; the latter are chronic and with enough foresight can potentially be dealt with at a societal level via the usual public health measures for containing communicable diseases.

Building on that analysis, while the assessment focused on the human immune system, it is important to keep in mind that there are other potential systems that may also prove to be vulnerable to manipulation. For example, human neurobiology is immensely complex, and there are already a variety of genetic and chemical means to manipulate the overall mental health of individuals…

The concept of genes as weapons encompasses the development of synthetic genes that could change human physiology, either on their own or potentially delivered as an augment to a known pathogen. This concept also encompasses the possibility of delivering synthetic genes for small RNAs (or the synthetic small RNAs themselves) that could impact host physiology via interference mechanisms. Genes have a unique position in the biological threat pantheon, being somewhere between pieces of genomes, in which case they can be considered as just parts of pathogens, and being toxins, chemical compounds capable of harm without necessarily replicating. There are multiple difficulties that surround their delivery and a limited number of military scenarios in which an adversary would find it worthwhile to alter human physiology over time frames longer than a single battle or campaign. That said, some scenarios, such as the use of dermal transfection to create shRNAs or miRNAs that alter human physiology, or the use of gene drives to alter insect populations to deliver noxious compounds to humans, may present more attractive options from the perspective of an adversary.

In addition, threats related to horizontal gene transfer in synergy with the threats posed by pathogens may lead to new modes of attack. Just as clinical trials of immunotherapies are increasingly a roadmap for engineering cytokine storms, the increasing knowledge on gene deletions, gene additions, and small-RNA modifications of human cells may provide a roadmap for the induction of noninfectious disease states that could be abetted by pathogen engineering (and, conversely, that could abet the spread of the pathogens themselves, such as via immunodeficiency viruses).

Relevant developments to monitor for each of these capabilities are summarized in Table 6-1.

See also: Models of Coronavirus Pathogenesis and Immunity, Anne Elizabeth Beall, A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Chapel Hill 2019. Approved by: Ralph S. Baric, Mark T. Heise, Nat Moorman, Martin Ferris, Melinda Beck, Jason Whitmire.

1. INTRODUCTION

   Understanding Synthetic Biology, 11
   Assessing Potential Biodefense Concerns, 12
   Mitigating Potential Biodefense Concerns, 12

   Study Approach, 13

2. BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE AGE OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 15

   What Is Synthetic Biology, 15
   Implications of the Age of Synthetic Biology, 18
   Specific Synthetic Biology Technologies and Applications, 21

3. FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING CONCERN ABOUT SYNTHETIC
   BIOLOGY CAPABILITIES 23

   Approach to Developing the Framework, 23
   Factors for Assessing Concern, 25
   Applying the Framework in the Assessment of Concern, 31

4. ASSESSMENT OF CONCERNS RELATED TO PATHOGENS 37

   Re-Creating Known Pathogens, 38
   Making Existing Pathogens More Dangerous, 44
   Creating New Pathogens, 54

   Summary, 57

5. ASSESSMENT OF CONCERNS RELATED TO PRODUCTION OF CHEMICALS OR
   BIOCHEMICALS 59

   Manufacturing Chemicals or Biochemicals by Exploiting Natural Metabolic Pathways, 61
   Manufacturing Chemicals or Biochemicals by Creating Novel Metabolic Pathways, 64

   Making Biochemicals via In Situ Synthesis, 65 Summary, 69

6. ASSESSMENT OF CONCERNS RELATED TO BIOWEAPONS THAT ALTER THE
   HUMAN HOST 71

   Modifying the Human Microbiome, 71
   Modifying the Human Immune System, 74
   Modifying the Human Genome, 77
   Summary, 81

7. RELATED DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY IMPACT THE ABILITY TO EFFECT AN ATTACK USING A SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY–ENABLED WEAPON 85

   Barriers to the Use of Bioweapons, 85
   Relevant Convergent Technologies, 87
   Summary, 92

8. OPTIONS FOR MITIGATING CONCERNS 95

   Current Mitigation Approaches and Infrastructure, 95
   Mitigation Challenges Posed by Synthetic Biology, 100
   Potential Opportunities to Advance Mitigation Capabilities, 104

   Summary, 112

9. MOVING FORWARD: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 115 Overarching Recommendation, 116
   Concerns Posed by Synthetic Biology–Enabled Capabilities, 116
   Future Use of the Framework, 125

   Biodefense Implications of the Age of Synthetic Biology, 126
   REFERENCES 129

1. APPENDIXES

A Specific Synthetic Biology Concepts, Approaches, and Tools 147

B Selected Prior Analyses Used to Inform the Framework 157

C Questions to Stimulate Consideration of Framework Factors 163

D Committee Biographies 167

E Disclosure of Conflict of Interest 171

F Study Methods

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Our Lady of Good Counsel. Painting by Pasquale Sarullo.